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Book Reviews
George Friedman, The Next 100 Years—a Forecast for the 21st
century. Doubleday, 2009.
Historians who predict events more than a year or two ahead are on a very
slippery slope. Most prediction tends to be linear: going in a straight line from here to
there. This is why the popular press gets it wrong when they predict economic trends
or predict our next conflicts; they see things continuing forever in economics (which
is never so) and alternately underestimate our enemies until we are hit—and then
overestimate their capability. Malcolm Gladwell's book, Tipping Point, does much
better with prediction because he demonstrates the cyclical nature of events—which
pile up unnoticed until they are at a point that tips, and a change swings in.
George Friedman seems to employ this methodology as well. He heads
Strategic Forecasts (a company that forecasts political, social, and economic trends)
and has taken on a century-long forecast that I have found surprising and fascinating.
He explains his methodology: "I have no crystal ball. I do, however, have a
method that has served me well, imperfect though it might be, in understanding the
past and anticipating the future. Underneath the disorder of history, my task is to try
to see the order—and to anticipate what events, trends, and technology that order will
bring forth." He knows that he will not get it all right, but expects his grandchildren to
look at his book and find it "not half bad."
Friedman's method requires a keen knowledge of past history and an
analytical grasp of what makes cultures tick. His description of the United States, for
example, is that we are "headstrong, immature, and brilliant." We are like a giant
adolescent, tromping on the neighbors' gardens. But we also have the good
heartedness of youth—and unlike many around the world, do not maintain centurylong grudges.
Every prediction he has made arises organically out of prior historic patterns.
For example, any good 19th century analyst could (and did) see that Germany, Russia,
and the United States would be the giants of the 20th century and that conflict would
arise. (Nobody noticed Japan, however, until they shocked the world by trouncing the
great Russian Empire in the 1905 naval battle in the Pacific.)
Friedman's take on the "war on terror" avoids the panicky view of those who
see Militant Islam as more powerful than it is. Militant Islam is no different than all
of the terrorist groups that assassinated and frightened Europe in the 19th century.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2011
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These terrorists have nothing to offer, and they eventually lose the support of people
they need. This is already happening because Nihilism never has a following for long.
But in looking at the next 100 years, Friedman does see a continuing conflict
that arises out of the fear of traditional societies over what they see as overwhelming
technological and social changes affecting their world. The emancipation of women
particularly frightens and angers those whose societies have been timelessly
patriarchal. They will continue to fight these social changes, but will ultimately lose.
Other interesting predictions are: the American Age will continue until the
end of the 21st century. China and India, considered big rivals for global power, have
internal problems that will hamper their success. Russia, which is now showing signs
of belligerent resurgence, has a demographic problem (drastic population decline)
that will serve it ill.
But new players will emerge to challenge our status as the single
superpower—players who will form coalitions and take us on: Japan and Turkey, as
an Asian coalition (he makes a surprisingly good case for this) and a new coalition
that will take on the Russians, formed by Poland and an Eastern European bloc (that
we will support). Fascinating stuff!
He predicts amazing technological breakthroughs as a result of space war
(already in development) that will spin off as civilian technologies that will benefit us
all. Yes, warfare is not just a dead issue, but is somehow ever with us—although no
longer as deadly to civilians as 20th century war. Silicon Valley should read this with
interest—as should we all.
Laina Farhat-Holzman

Madden, Thomas F., Empires of Trust—How Rome Built—and
America is Building—A New World. Plume Books, Penguin, 2008.
Classics professors are making a comeback after years of being out of fashion.
Madden, a professor of history at Saint Louis University, has produced a very
different look at ancient Rome and America—one that may prove to be much more
useful to us than the usual jeremiads about the decline of America. Madden has
pinpointed the most important shared characteristic that sets Rome and America apart
from other empires: they are empires of trust, not conquest. The comparisons he
found between the Roman Republic and the American Republic are uncanny, and can
be instructive in managing our power in today's world.
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He begins his book with an impressive quote from Roman historian Titus
Livius (Livy):
There is an exceptionally beneficial and fruitful advantage to be derived from
the study of the past. There you see, set in the clear light of historical truth,
examples of every possible type. From these you can select for yourself and
your country what to imitate, and also what, as being mischievous in its
inception and disastrous in its consequences, you should avoid.
What is it about Romans that seems so modern, even after the passage of
almost 2500 years, since they first appeared in Italy? And why has America always
been identified (and identifies itself) as "the new Rome?" There is obviously
something to this.
The attacks on America on 9/11/01 jolted many of us into a renewed interest
in history. We were attacked by a group of people with a medieval religious cult,
using modern weapons of destruction that their civilization could never have
invented. They justified their attack on a warped view of history, one most
Westerners did not know enough to question: that the Crusades began the West's long
war against Islam—a war that continues to this day.
This is nonsense that only a few historians have challenged. In fact, the
Crusades were a European response to Muslim aggression—including invasions,
massacres, and forced conversions of what had been Christian North Africa, Egypt,
and Spain. How else did the Christian population go from 90 percent to less than 10%
in these regions so quickly? Understanding history can set us straight and the far past
can inform the present and future. We will never understand what hit us if we only
look to the past 50 years.
Most of the books that compare Rome and America look to the Rome of the
late Empire, which was colorfully decadent and in the minds of moralists was a
model for the decline of America, which in their eyes is as sexually permissive as late
Rome had been. However, this was not the Rome that even long after its demise (and
Rome had a 2,000 year run, ending with the Muslim conquest of Constantinople in
1453) has been a model of good governance, rule of written law, and high level of
trust by its many allies.
Rome was an "empire of trust" of which many countries and tribes wanted to
become part. Just as today, despite the habitual badmouthing of the United States,
people around the world would like to live here. We have something that they do not,
and if they could, they would vote with their feet.
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I thought I knew Roman history until I read this book. Obviously I knew
much more about late Rome than the Rome that created not only a republic far better
than the Athenians, who had invented democracy, but also a long history of strategic
alliances, not conquests, that evolved into a virtual "empire of trust."
What is uncanny in this book are the parallel tracks of Rome's rise and that of
the United States, perhaps not so unusual considering that our founding fathers
deliberately modeled themselves after the Roman Republic—which can still be seen
in our official architecture, institutions, and system of law. Our very conservatism,
piety, and what we call the "Protestant ethic" is much like that of Republican Rome.
Some of the issues that obviously parallel our experiences are:
• Carping. The "old world" constantly criticized and carped against the "new
world." Rome put up with the Greeks (the old, sophisticated world), who needed
their protection but never stopped their carping. Throughout America's history, the
"old world of Europe" has carped against us, even though we have saved them from
horrors numerous times.
• Sophisticated Culture. Educated Romans loved Greek culture, but had to
pretend not to be an "elite," just as American politicians, no matter how erudite, must
pretend to be "everyman." John Kerry's knowledge of French did not serve him well
in American politics.
• National Security was the main motivator of Roman foreign policy, as it is
for the United States. Both states were essentially isolationist, which proved folly for
each when seriously attacked (Rome by the Gauls and later Carthage and the United
States by Japan in 1941). They both learned that isolationism does not protect a state
from evil out there—and had to develop tools, in addition to warfare itself, to keep
themselves safe. Both did it so well that despite today's headlines, we live in a Pax
Americana as good as the Pax Romana. Peace, not war, is really our norm—and has
been since we first seriously started to engage with the world in 1900.
Madden quotes a speech made by an American president that may surprise
you:
"As we defend the peace, we also have an historic opportunity to preserve the
peace. We have our best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth
century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare
for war. The history of the last century, in particular, was dominated by a series of
destructive national rivalries that left battlefields and graveyards across the Earth.
Germany fought France, the Axis fought the Allies, and then the East fought the
West, in proxy wars and tense standoffs against a backdrop of nuclear Armageddon.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol64/iss64/11
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"Competition between great nations is inevitable, but armed conflict in our
world is not. More and more civilized nations find ourselves on the same side—
united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos. America has, and intends
to keep, military strengths beyond challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms
races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of
peace."
This was George W. Bush at West Point, 2002, spelling out the "Bush
Doctrine"; it could have been a Roman speech during the Roman Republic.
Madden warns that Pax Americana does not end all wars, any more than
Rome's did; however pax for both was the norm. We can see the way cities were built
in Roman times—without defensive walls—as are ours today. We do not need to live
in an armed camp—something we should consider when we overestimate the
capabilities of our terrorist enemies.
• Roman and American Educations. In Rome's time, kings' sons from
everywhere were sent to Rome for education. America enjoys the same advantage
today—which provides important friendships with other countries' elites.
• Predictions of Decline. Polybius (born 203 BC), a Greek historian who lived
in Rome, wrote disparagingly of Rome's excessive wealth and declining morality,
predicting its downfall. He was off by 1600 years. When Rome defeated its final great
enemy, Carthage, in 146 BC, the Roman writer Sallust believed that this was bad for
Rome. Being the world's lone superpower would puff them up and split Romans into
mindless political factions. The same was said when America became the sole
superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union. With Rome, it did destroy their
Republic and created their Empire.
Most predictions of our demise do not survive the light of day, however. Our
"rivals" have many more serious problems than we do—making their dazzling
performances of today a chimera. I am thinking of China and India. Our Islamist
enemies are thoroughly delusional in thinking they have the means to take over the
world.
Which brings us to the most astonishing chapter in Madden's book: The
Threat of Terrorism.
When I think of the origins of terrorism, I usually cite The Old Man of the
Mountain, a Persian 10th century terrorist who sent out hashish-seduced assassins (the
name is taken from the use of that drug) who could murder anybody, anywhere in the
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known world. This cult flourished for several centuries, sowing terror everywhere,
until finally wiped out by the Mongols, bent on their own world conquest.
But Madden tells us of the kind of terrorism that the Romans endured, and
surprisingly its site was first-century Judea. With a great deal of contemporary
testimony, he presents a period in which Judea had become a maelstrom of religious
frenzy. Jewish zealots, fragmented into numerous cults, were in the grips of Messiah
madness. They, like the Islamists of today, expected that through their efforts, a
messiah (or Caliph) would come to help them conquer the world and convert
everyone to their version of their faith. The zealots hated the Romans, who were there
by treaty (Empire of Trust) and even more, hated those Jews who wanted to
assimilate into Roman culture, practicing their religion as a matter of private
conscience.
Today's Israel has the same contentious dichotomy within Judaism; and
Islam, the world over, is caught in a similar conflict—the zealots against the
secularists. It should be remembered that A1 Qaeda and its fellow Islamists have
killed more Muslims than Christians or Jews. During the ancient turmoil, the zealots
terrorized both Jews and Roman and Greek citizens, until Rome had to act.
Rome was just as puzzled over this religious frenzy as we are over the
Islamists—and no matter what they did, they could not quiet the turmoil. Eventually,
things became so bad that the Romans finally reacted in a way that the terrorists
should have anticipated: giving no quarter. How terrorists thought that they could
take on the mighty Romans is hard to fathom.
Madden describes how Rome finally ended the long war against terror: they
finally brought on a change in Judaism—at least the violent phase of first-century
Judaism. By destroying the temple and exiling most of the people from Jerusalem,
Judaism was slowly transformed into the religion it has been for the past two
thousand years—a religion of rabbis and schools of learning—not temples and the
radical politics that characterized Jerusalem at the time of Jesus.
Madden speculates that if the Islamists ever succeeded in attacking an
American city with a nuclear or other weapon of mass destruction, we might well
respond as the Romans did and Islam would either reform or be wiped out. I am not
so sure that we would have the will to do such a thing—but perhaps, under such
draconian circumstances, we would.
The final chapter of this book deals with the question of the fall of Rome and
the decline of the United States. In this case, he sees a great difference between the
Roman state, particularly the late Empire, and our own still young country with a
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol64/iss64/11
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much more resilient governmental system. We are not on the skids yet—nor is any
serious rival to us on the horizon for some time to come.
Understand yesterday if you want to understand tomorrow.
Laina Farhat-Holzman

Aaron Tyler, Islam, the West, and Tolerance: Conceiving Coexistence.
New York: Palgrave, 2008.
Aaron Tyler's book is about tolerance, coexistence, and reconciling religious
and ideological differences. The book begins by giving an excellent background
analysis of the points of divergence "between Islam and the West." The author
focuses on three broad themes that reflect theoretical and substantial perspectives.
First, the modern world is described as characterized by anxious dilemma in
the face of post-September 11 trauma. The dark incident of September 11, 2001 has
unleashed angry recriminations between the Muslim world and the West.
Even though fringe groups and malcontents in the name of Islam have
conducted terrorist acts, their misguided acts need not be attributed to Islam. By
comparison with Christianity and other religions, Islam is not more violent than the
rest. Episodic violence by Muslims in direct reaction to the West's geostrategic
interests, such as the "double standard regarding the Palestinian-Israeli question,"
unquestioning support for the state of Israel, the Iraqi invasion, and cultural invasion
in the form of "Western secularism and materialism" may have aroused anger among
some extremists. Extremists do not define Islam; Islam, in the fullness of its tenets, is
a religion of peace.
The apparent unease on the part of the West regarding Islam is an inevitable
outcome of Islam seeking to validate itself in the face of globalization driven by
Western power and influence. Islam must be tolerated, accommodated, and welcomed
by the West. Tolerance, an ancient concept common in the medieval era, that had
played a critical role before the liberal ideology came into vogue, is essential today
and much more needed than ever before. The author differentiates tolerance from
toleration by dismissing toleration as a forced, reluctant, and matter of fact
acceptance of the Other. Tolerance is the opposite; it is a willing embrace of the Other
without any pretexts or contingencies. Islam's reticence toward — and skepticism of—
Western cultural values needs to be understood from the perspective of tolerance in
its authentic rendition.
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Western consumerism and materialism are perceived by many in the world of
Islam as a relentless threat to the survival of the religiocultural values and
traditions espoused by the greater Islamic community. The West's postmodern
relativism is regarded by many Muslims as intolerant to those traditional
Muslim communities that adhere to a system of absolutes (p. 2).

Second, the ubiquitous Huntington paradigm about the clash of civilizations,
looked at from the point of view of this book, is not without merit. The author agrees
with Huntington that "colliding" ideologies have caused cross-cultural
misunderstandings and upheavals. Even though Huntington was a nationalist zealot
who expressed his pessimism about Islam as a menace to Western civilization, his
misgivings concerning multiculturalism on Western terms fit well with Islam's
rejection of multiculturalism on Islam's terms. In order to reverse the impending
"cultural confrontation", the author argues that "Islam and the West" must learn to
"coexist." Against this backdrop, Western intolerance of Islam seeking its own ways
of perpetual validation is an obstacle to coexistence.
Many Muslims view the West's dissemblance of tolerance as a disingenuous,
valueless indifference, where individuals are extracted from their group
identities, and a universal strangeness and religious apathy are espoused.
Muslims describe the thin conceptualization of tolerance that dominates the
West as nothing more than hypocritical relativism or indifference, intolerant
of absolute convictions (p. 161).
Third, coexistence is the essential antidote to conflict. Historians such as
Bernard Lewis identify coexistence as a prudent alternative. Muslims, such as the
grand mufti of Syria, and Christian and Jewish religious leaders have identified the
indispensability of coexistence. They have called for respect and understanding of
religious and cultural diversities. According to Tyler,
Coexistence is a pragmatic desideratum for reframing the complex inimical
relationship between Islam and the West. In general, coexistence carries with
it the positive recognition of lasting difference and involves a necessary
tension that is tempered through attitudes of forbearance and humility, a
shared desire for greater transparency and understanding, and a willingness to
utilize nonviolent discourse as the sole alternative for harmonizing dissonance
(pp. 5-6).
The book has six chapters plus the introduction. The introduction and Chapter
One are definitional. They give solid analytical definition to the cultural and
civilizational environment currently challenging Islam and the West. There is a
restive environment driven by religious and cultural apprehensions and suspicions.
Instead of "converging," the two civilizations, Islam and the West, may end up
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol64/iss64/11
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"colliding" unless the restive environment begging for resolution is resolved. The two
civilizations do have rich traditions of tolerance in their respective texts that they can
use to temper each other's tendency for intolerance.
Chapter Three, entitled Modern Tolerance, describes tolerance, and, based on
the operationalized concept, calls attention to the vast immigrant communities in
Europe mainly from Muslim countries. The author then looks at France from the
perspective of the French liberal tradition. France represents the ultimate liberal
zealot state deeply loyal to the virtues of individual freedoms. The 2003 -2004
turmoil caused by forbidding Muslim women to wear headscarves in public places is
indefensible from the point of view of personal freedom. Even though ideologically,
the banning can be defended, it can only be justified from the individual point of view
and not from the "communal" point of view. The author cites Rawls' theory of justice
to modify the application of individual liberty in favor of "communitarian" authority.
The UNESCO definition of tolerance and the United Nations Universal Declaration
of Human Rights are also deemed as inadequate for resolving the crisis of confidence
between the two civilizations.
Unmistakably, the author slants individual rights as Western values which the
Islamic societies should not be obliged to endorse. Individual rights are regarded as
"valueless indifference, where individuals are extracted from their group identities."
In other words, if freedom of choice and free exercise of faith by the citizen mean the
right for the believer to reject his or her faith in favor of another, it is unacceptable
and unwarranted. The individual who is committed to one faith may abandon his/her
religion without retribution from the community.
In order to prevent this destabilizing onslaught on established confessions,
individual freedom and the promotion of individual liberties must not go so far as to
reach the world of Islam. The author is ambivalent about the unrestricted access for
proselytizing that the world of Islam enjoys in the West. Chapter Three concludes by
using the city of Marseilles, France as an example of tolerance where citizens of
different faiths live in peace regardless of their religious and ethnic differences. The
success of Marseilles is due to the autonomy each confessional group has enjoyed in
exercising "absolute convictions" of orthodox theology within its community without
being questioned by city officials and other groups.
Chapter Four, Discovering Islam and Chapter Five, A Diverse Sampling of
Tolerance in the History of Islam, give an elaborate catalogue of Muslim groups in
the Middle East, East Asia and the Indian Subcontinent. The chapters are meant to
convince the reader that Islam embodies internal attributes of tolerance and
coexistence. Within Islam, there are extremists who are purist exclusionists.
Examples are Abul A'Ala Mauddi, the founder of the Pakistani group, Jamaat-eIslami, and the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, intellectual mentor of the Al Qaeda leader,
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2011
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Ayman al Zawahiri. These are explained in the book as dogmatic, intolerant, and as
anti-Islam as they are anti-West. A "mechanical" interpretation of the Quran has
enabled these groups to view Islam as an intolerant faith. "Mechanically" looking at
these groups and attributing their bigotry to Islam does equal disservice to Islam and
to the West.
Condemning the purist exclusionists as un-Islamic, the author seeks scriptural
authority in Islam to convince the reader of Islam's level of tolerance. He states,
Islam's potency lies in the lucidity of its moral imagination, which holds
magistrates and citizens responsible to one another and ultimately accountable
to God. Many Muslims today are revisiting and interpreting the wellspring of
values inherent to Islamic tradition and jurisprudence (p. 108).
The author adds that Islamic scholars rely on the prospect of the West
"confirming" the Shari'a as representing "true human equality and justice, two moral
elements that are 'pivotal to the value structure of Islam'." Whether other faiths such
as Christianity or Judaism hold similar "moral elements" is not mentioned throughout
the book.
Chapter Six is a concluding summary and an analysis of the previous chapters.
The superb analytical skills of the author are revealed in the way he brings together
the concepts of tolerance and coexistence in their Islamic and Western contexts. The
Western concept of tolerance, as was explained above, was demonstrated in the fourth
century A. D. when Emperor Constantine promulgated the Edict of Milan. The
numerous communities or nationalities governed under the scepter of that Empire had
absolute control over the rights and liberties of their respective citizens. Similarly, the
Umayyad Dynasty in the eighth century and the Ottoman Empire that followed it
employed the dhimma and the millet system respectively to guarantee communal
freedoms without forcing the state to advocate individual liberties and rights. The
book then meanders in an analytical trance repeating previously stated themes. The
analysis is sustained and masterful. Yet the analytical gem is betrayed by the biased
slant in favor of Islam that the author suffers from throughout the text.
The extent of Islamist "interpreting the wellspring of values" refers to the
tenets of Shari 'a. For coexistence to become a reality, the author places the burden of
tolerance on what he termed "the West." Unquestioning acceptance of the Shari'a and
the Quran, based on recognition of their completeness and inerrancy, are the
conditions for which Muslims will countenance the prospects of coexistence. There is
no scriptural, cultural, or sociological reciprocity in seeking similar theological
grounds from Christianity or other confessions.
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The most critical purpose of the book, stating that Islam possesses scriptural
and historical experiences to demonstrate its level of tolerance, is based on the Quran
and the Shari'a as they both stand. By contrast, there are not religious texts or
theological doctrines mentioned in the book as representing non-Islamic societies.
The author escapes this imbalance by using the term the "West." In this case,
tolerance becomes an obligation for the West; it must tolerate the Shari'a-based
"religio-cultural" values of Islam.
The phrase "Islam and the West," heavily emphasized and repeated
throughout the book, appears benign at first look. The juxtaposing of faith and a
specific region of the world as antagonists harboring ill will against each other due to
religious intolerance is loaded with biased undertones against the Christian West. The
author blames Western societies for harboring ill will against Islam. As he does so,
selective verses from the Quran are floated to illustrate Islamic tolerance. At the same
time, Western values such as liberty, justice, equality, and the broad measures of
human rights provided in the Western religious and secular institutions are
overlooked or dismissed simply as elements of "Western postmodern relativism" (p.
106).
The analytical dexterity of Aaron Tyler is undeniable. The book is rich in
details and solid in theoretical grounding. Alas, Tyler missed an opportunity to
balance his gaze; he should have looked equally towards Christianity and Islam. He
cleverly uses the word "West" as a proxy for Christianity in order to exonerate Islam
from its fundamental weaknesses.
Is Tyler a polemicist and an apologist of Islam using rhetorical devices to
represent Islam as a plaintiff or is Tyler an honest broker seeking common intellectual
ground for both sides to agree upon? These are two questions left unanswered in this
otherwise great work on tolerance and coexistence between Islam and the West.
Tseggai Isaac

Laurie Maguire, Helen of Troy. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
This book, subtitled "From Homer to Hollywood," examines the power of
myth over actual reality. There is no basis for the actual reality (including the vaunted
physical attributes) of the woman who "launched a thousand ships." Yet her story has
been told and retold for over two thousand years. She is perhaps the most famous
female never to have existed.
The tale has Helen abducted from Sparta, where she was the wife or about to
be the wife of the King of Sparta, Menelaus, by the son of the King of Troy. Her
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2011
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abduction, whether willing or unwilling, is the cause of the subject of the first great
epic of western literature. Based on the 10-year Trojan War (Troy was located in
Asia Minor near the Dardanelles, the straits between the Black Sea and the
Mediterranean), The Iliad was written in the 8 th century B.C. E. The Iliad recounts
the war between Sparta and its Greek allies against Troy (also a trading rival). In fact,
the actual war did occur several centuries before between the then-dominant Greek
city-states, Mycenae and Troy. We do not know Helen's actual fate in the Homeric
epic other than that she is reclaimed and leaves Troy (the war took 10 years of
preparation and the siege lasted 10 years) nor does the even more famous sequel, The
Odyssey, mention her except to castigate her at the beginning. Other recounts give a
myriad of endings for Helen from return to death to disappearance, but there is no
central text.
The classical scholar, Laurie Maguire, is not so much interested in Helen, the
historical figure, as she is Helen the myth, Helen as the symbol of beauty, the
significance of her abduction, and to what degree Helen is held accountable in the
various myths about the Trojan War. Helen's latter-day emergence in the Faust
legend, and recently even in parody are also covered. Helen as a literary figure is
usually presented as an enigma, a passive figure who causes things to happen by her
mere presence, and an unmoved mover. She is the original "femmc fatale." Helen is
essentially a blank upon which many writers, poets, playwrights, novelists, and
dramatists, from classical times to the 2003 TV miniseries Helen of Troy, have
engaged in endless speculation. She is present in both classical and popular culture.
In the movies, the most famous popular "Helen" was Rossana Podesta in Helen of
Troy (which I saw in 1955); another "Helen" was Diane Kruger in the 2004 movie
Troy. Helen has seized the imagination of the ages. Why is this?
In answering the last question, Dr. Maguire examines various aspects of the
legend. Appropriately, the first chapter deals with the myth of origin of Helen. There
may be a link between Helen and a fertility and tree goddess, but there are no textual
references to Helen that predate the Homeric epics. The author can only speculate
that it was a separate narrative worked into the previous account of a Mycenaean
attack under Agamemnon, king of Mycenae, against his rival.
The next chapter discusses Helen's most famous attribute, her beauty.
Dramatists and poets, from Aeschylus and Euripides to Virgil to Chaucer to
Shakespeare to William Butler Yeats to Giraudoux, have not dealt with specifics.
This is, as the author explains, because the concept of beauty is an abstract one. It is
undefined and can never be realized since it represents the object of desire. When
represented pictorially or visually as on stage and screen, it runs the risk of being
criticized as not being beautiful enough. It is an ideal that must not be spoiled by
concrete details.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol64/iss64/11

12

Farhat-Holzman et al.: Book Review

Comparative Civilizations Review

129

The third chapter deals with the abduction of Helen, sometimes presented as a
rape. It is not specifically mentioned in Homer, but abductions of women are
mentioned in the 5th century by the historian Herodotus as one of the causes of the
war. The question of whether it was rape or marital infidelity has been the subject of a
number of interpretations including a recent American television film on Helen. The
interpretation of this act is the basis of chapter four, which examines what degree of
blame is to be assigned to Helen. Did Helen's sexuality led to war and the
destruction of Troy? The assigning of blame or the not assigning of blame was often
based on the period in which the writers wrote.
Chapter 5 examines Helen's most famous incarnation as the temptation used
by the Devil to make a bargain with Dr. Faustus (and then Faust) in Marlowe's and
Goethe's famous plays. She is essentially voiceless in these famous plays, but a
recent version makes her a spokesperson for gender politics.
As Maguire shows us in the final chapter, the endless applicability of the
legend of Helen has arrived at the point of parody. As early as the 5 lh century B.C.E.,
Helen was parodied in Greek plays. In a work of the early modern period, Spenser's
The Faerie Queen, Helen is satirized. She is also satirized in the famous 19lh century
Offenbach operetta La Belle Helene. In numerous films and novels in the twentieth
century, Helen has received unorthodox treatment. One recent novel, in fact,
recreates Helen as a Caribbean heroine. The author even identifies Helen with
Virginia Woolf s Clarissa Dalloway.
The endless re-creation, re-interpretation, and re-invention of Helen of Troy is
the main point of the book. The character is eternally fascinating because she is
eternally elusive. How can you define the indefinable?
Norman C. Rothman

Heinz Schilling, Early Modern European Civilization and its Political
and Cultural Dynamism. Lebanon, NH: University Press of New
England, 2008.
Most historians have related modernity in both economic and political
development to a catch-all category such as the Protestant or Calvinist or New
Testament ethic, and most recently the Confucian ethic, in relation to the
geographical or cultural area where the evolution took place. In respect to western
Europe, the period between 1500 and 1800 A.D/C.E, typically called "early modern",
often is describes via the increasing prominence of western and northern Europe; it is
seen as the period of the advent of the Protestant or Calvinist era wherein the focus of
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man shifted from otherworldly concerns, characterized in the previous Medieval
period, to worldly concerns.
Under this construct, individual activities of daily life in the early modern
period were related directly to Providence. The gospel of hard work or the gospel of
success was related to the Almighty. If one worked hard and prospered, it was a sign
of divine favor. The Calvinist version of Protestantism — identified with Geneva, the
Dutch Republic, the Huguenots in France, and the Congregationalists and
Presbyterians of England and Scotland in particular — had the idea of predestination
and the elect or elite pre-ordained for worldly success obtained through hard work.
One who worked hard, was industrious, and accumulated capital and goods might be
considered godly. Thus, the accumulation of capital was considered divinely
sanctioned, and modern capitalism was born.
With capitalism came its modern characteristics, such as currency backed by
specie (in addition to specie), banks, letters of credit, stock exchanges, and insurance
companies. With the growth of international and long-range trade as well as internal
trade, plus the concomitant growth of commerce and cities, a new set of actors
emerged. The emerging middle and urban classes with their associated values
exerted influence on the emerging national states as they stocked the growing state
bureaucracy and exerted influence through representative assemblies with their
control of purse strings. Ultimately, this new accountability in much of Western
Europe and its overseas extensions in America and Oceania led to the development of
representative government.
The main thesis of the book, derived from a series of lectures given by a
distinguished authority on modern European history in 2006, was that early modern
European history is characterized not so much by a break from religion-dominated
European society as by the use of religion as an agent of modernization, even
including secularization. The author terms this process "confessionalization."
Schilling posits that the development of national religions - whether Lutheran,
Calvinist, Anglican, or even post-Reformation Catholic— helped form the modern
national state, since these national churches encouraged modernity as exemplified by
universal, pluralistic, liberal, and democratic industrialized societies. Each of these
churches developed a modern and professional trained bureaucracy. Such processes
as translating the Bible—the Lutheran Bible in Germany and the Anglican King
James Bible in England—into national languages helped to shape individual countries
into distinctive cultural entities. After 1650, the religious energy introduced by
confessionalization was converted into secularization as the emphasis on science and
enlightenment converted divinely inspired influences into natural rights as a type of
secular spiritualism. The gospel of hard work was converted in the eighteenth
century into Yankee ingenuity in New England, for instance.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol64/iss64/11
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The author admits the process was self-contradictory, but he maintains that the
roots of the secular trends after 1650 derived from confessionalization and the
religious impulse. Even the reaction against deism (rationalized religion of G-d as the
great physicist in the sky) such as pietism (e.g. Quakerism), Methodism, and the
Baptist revivals in Protestant societies and Jansenism in Catholic societies, can be
seen as religious reactions. The author gives as exemplars for the identification of
religion with nationality (and the parallel economic and political change that resulted)
Sweden on the Protestant side and Spain on the Catholic side.
The author bases each chapter on his three lectures, which in turn are a
crystallization of his research over several decades. After the introduction, the second
chapter is devoted to the confessionalization theme described in the above section.
His major position here, which challenges traditional historiography, is that he does
not see early modern Europe as marking a break with Medieval culture and society in
terms of the gulf between the sacred and profane. In Latin Western Christianity, in
areas such as Roman law, urban self-government, and financial and commercial
dealings, church and state were intertwined. The church was always influenced by
classical thought, and philosophy and educational patterns continued in both
Medieval and early modern times. Europe-at least as defined by the author to
include the western half and not the orthodox eastern half—always had non-Christian
elements (Islam in the southern and southwestern fringes and the Jewish diaspora)
and was composed of diverse influences from Greece, Rome, Germanic elements, and
Judaism. Dualism was present from the beginning, especially in such non-spiritual
enterprises as the Inquisition, Crusades, religious persecutions, and forcible
conversions.
The third chapter examines the role of religious refugees in the host countries.
These refugees, whether Protestant refugees from the Catholic sections of the Low
Countries, the Sephardic Jewish refugees from Iberia, or Huguenot refuges from
France, brought commercial, financial, and industrial skills (textiles, metals, and
luxury goods) to the host countries and replaced the closed guild structure of the
Middle Ages with a more entrepreneurial approach. This benefited cities such as
London, Amsterdam, and Hamburg or more generally, Scandinavia, Germany, the
northern Netherlands, England, and parts of Colonial America. The agricultural
revolution of the 18th century that included the drainage of marshes and the uses of
fertilizer in England was influenced by the work of Dutch and Walloon refugees. All
of these refugees sought religious freedom or at least toleration and brought with
them their own culture. Ultimately, after their initial isolation, they opened up the
recipient societies to the heterogeneity typical of modern urban centers; they were
thus carriers of change, including modernity.
The final chapter is based on Schilling's final lecture; it links the incidence of
confessionalism to the advent of the international state system. The universalism of
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the medieval Western political order with pope and emperor at the apex was replaced
by arrangements among states based on a combination of secular and religious
interests. These arrangements eventually devolved into the balance of power and the
modern diplomatic system. The author indicates that this change took place in four
stages: the attempt by the Habsburgs at universal domination challenged by France
and the Ottoman Turks; the Spanish hegemony challenged by the Protestant sea
powers of Holland and England; the aftermath of the Treaty of Westphalia, seen as
the beginning of modern diplomacy (this reviewer would take issue with this stage
and classify it also as a reaction to the hegemony of France in western Europe and
Sweden in northern Europe, hegemonies opposed by a mixture of powers of different
religions); and the balance of power after 1720 involving five major powers (Austria,
England, France, Prussia, and Russia), which lasted to the French Revolution.
This slender volume presents a thesis that applies only to western Europe.
Schilling does not apply it to eastern Europe and indicates that it does not apply to the
Islamic world. It is meant to be regionally specific and is not meant as a universal
analysis of modernity. In this rather circumscribed objective, it succeeds.
Norman C. Rothman

Sing C. Chew, The Recurring Dark Ages: Ecological Stress, Climate
Changes, and System Transformation. Altamira Press: Lanham, MD,
2007.
This is the second in a trilogy. It follows the publication in 2001 of the
author's World Ecological Degradation: Urbanization, and Deforestation, 3000 BC AD 2000 and it precedes the 2008 appearance of the third in the series, Ecological
Futures: What History Can Teach Us. Doctor Chew is co-editor of the journal,
Nature and Culture, and the scholarly theme of this book on the Dark Ages is
consonant with the vital sector of academic research into civilizational history. I
highly recommend this book to ISCSC members. Moreover, the author lists in his
bibliography the key works of Andre Gunder Frank, an ISCSC member we all know,
and the indefatigable, irrepressible, invaluable David Wilkinson, whom we all love.
The subtitles of this book on the Dark Ages pretty much say it all: "Ecological
Stress, Climate Changes, and System Transformation." Chew's text provides
exhaustive analysis with empirical measures of what might be categorized as
"environmental factors." He matches these with historical phenomena such as the
invention of metallurgy; the diffusion of currency; the manufacture of pottery,
jewelry and glass; the utilization of weaponry; and general types of state organization
paired with cultural expression. The creativity of this scholarship, I think, is in how
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol64/iss64/11
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the author links various and well-known topics to more opaque data from scientific
sources and blends both to forge a comprehensive view of the interaction between
nature and civilization. In his introduction (xvi) he states that "history is theory and
theory is history." This is his justification for identifying three major Dark Ages in
the human experience that are recognized in civilizational perspectives but opens the
door to add some innovative matching of cultural dimensions to ecological data. I
think the author succeeds in showing the interrelation of socioeconomic eclipse with
environmental events.
An example of his analytical methodology is delivered early on (26ff) where
he explores the unavailability of materials for pottery creation as the chief explanation
for a decline in pottery's quality in Egypt as well as in Mesopotamia after 3200 BC.
While Braudel (2001) is cited for tying causality to the invention of the potter's wheel
in Mesopotamia, Chew points out that Egypt did not use the potter's wheel until
around 2600 BC. Why then the simultaneous decline? Chew suggests on Page 27
that "trade disruption with the natural resource-producing hinterland areas ... (caused
by depressed ecological conditions...) forced the skirting of pottery design." He
engages in similar analysis about textiles in the Fertile Crescent, both linen and wool.
Copper and tin come under like scrutiny. He cites his earlier book that analyzed the
use of timber and wood in order to underscore his point: trade in such items across
various territories with different civilizations can be affected by change in only one of
the termini. Thus, he reasons, simultaneous decline in quality or production of trade
items is often caused by simple ecological factors in one region that reverberate like
sound waves to a larger ambit. Let it be added that Chew does not make ecological
change the sole cause of such decline, but rather describes how material resources in
supply and demand provoke cultural, socioeconomic and ultimately civilizational
change.
In two places, the author provides lists of the Dark Ages of world civilization.
He cross-lists archeological data to substantiate his linkages to climatic effects that
are not man-made. The first list on page 41 is accompanied by Table 3.3 on page 54.
A digested version of his tables is found in Chapter 6 (Table 6.1, page 174), where
three Dark Ages are listed. Two occur in the Bronze Age: 2200-1700 BC, mostly in
the Fertile Crescent; and 1200-700 BC, in the Mediterranean, simultaneous with the
migration of the "Sea Peoples." The third decline comes during the Iron Age from
400 - 900 AD and is the same as Europe's Dark Ages. For Chew, "Dark Ages"
describe a decrease in population and flattening of commerce that endure for
substantial periods of about 600 years each. But while he admits that ecological
factors play a major role in shaping a Dark Age, he notes that as often as not, a
particular ecological effect has man-made policy as a cause for collapse. The theory
for the book is formulated on page 69:
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"Anthropogenic-induced ecological degradations along with climatological changes
have impacts on the reproduction and trajectory of the social system in question as
well as the world system at large."
The bulk of the book develops this concept around issues like deforestation in
Crete (82ff), the Sea Peoples (93ff), and the availability of tin (101) and copper to
make bronze. A Dark Age for Chew causes decentralization of existing systems such
as trade and government. The result of decentralization is often the erosion of
hierarchical systems that are replaced with more egalitarian participation in societies.
These trends provide an upside to every Dark Age because of the increasing need for
adaptation. Put another way "small is good for recovery." He casts the emergence of
the Greek polis as the civilizational replacement for the Persian Empire precisely
because of its greater adaptability during a time of scarcity.
Noting that tin and copper were trade items, he casts the Bronze Age as an
economy controlled from the palace (103). Such items fell into the category of
"prestige goods" (161). The Iron Age, in contrast, utilized materiel and technology
readily available even in the country-side and to itinerant smiths (104-105). He
provides archeological proof for this diagnosis by citing the remains of iron plows,
smelters and mines, etc. in areas outside the urbanized centers of the Bronze Age.
The book has an excellent treatment of the breakdown of the Roman system
after the war with the Goths in the early 5 th century. For those uninitiated into the
classic trade routes of antiquity, Chew provides extensive documentation of the trade
of Rome with China and India (132-33), just to mention some of the more exotic
Asian contacts. By describing the Roman city model as the dominant player in the
system leading into the 5 th century, the author prepares the reader to understand the
collapse that produced the European Dark Ages. We all know of these trends, I
suspect, but the data he provides as evidence is convincing. Rome had a population
of over a million in 367AD: at the end of the Dark Ages in 880 AD, the population of
the once-mightiest-city in the world had been reduced to 30,000 (152).
Chew analyzes the effort of Emperor Justinian to revive the Empire in the
West. The Roman city structure required considerable leather, iron, and grain to
maintain the army that patrolled the roads joining each city in the network. The
period was marked by an increasing aridity in soil, due in part to drought and rising
temperatures. This in turn limited agricultural production, stimulated fertilization of
exhausted soil by animal manure, over-grazing of pasture land to obtain the manure
and inevitable migration of groups outside the Empire to seek the store of food and
supplies in the cities, since the outlying regions suffered more drastically from the
climate change. The migration was complicated, since the barbarians had been
suppliers to the late Roman Empire of leather, wool, and metals. In fact, they had
served in the army in significant numbers. Thus, when the migration came, the
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol64/iss64/11
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barbarians were well acquainted with the Roman system, its strengths and its
weaknesses.
Migration also produces diseases, and the Bubonic Plague (144) during
Justinian's reign resulted in an estimated loss of 33% of the Empire's population. In
order to maintain this disintegrating system, Justinian raised land taxes to 50% of
production, creating even greater stress on the socioeconomic structures.
Note that aridity, the loss of agricultural land, even the plague are proven by
lists of pollen and other scientific evidence (146-148). Building upon a concept that
had been established earlier, Chew points out that Rome itself had been eclipsed in
the late Empire by provincial cities that had closer access to resources. Thus, the
cities of Spain and Southern Gaul, as well as many in Asia Minor had provided
decentralization of the urban system and away from Rome even before the onset of
the Dark Ages. When Europe entered the 6 th century, despite Justinian's efforts these
provincial cities also lost importance, so the process went from decentralization to deurbanization.
Chew provides a short transition from the collapse of these cities to their
replacement by the villa. As a self-sustaining agricultural complex, these villas
became substitutes for the network of cities and enclaves of Roman knowledge. With
the hegemony of Christianity, the villas were largely supplanted by the monasteries.
I would quibble here that the author has passed over the role of monasteries in
shaping new ecological alternatives that were employed as routes of escape from
Europe's Dark Age. For instance, the monks engaged in botanical science to create
new seeds for grains and vegetables, leaving us with traditions of monks' wine, beer,
cheese, bread and fruit preserves. Certain wild plants were domesticated for new
crops, such as strawberries, and there was pioneering work in animal husbandry.
Moreover, the monasteries gave us medicines and assembled information on
pharmaceutical procedures; the monks were famous for copying and illustrating
books, but of no less importance was their cultivation of music, in devising systems
of composition and for performance. The omission of the church contribution
notwithstanding, the author's narrative connects the emergence of monasteries that
replaced the late Empire cities and suggests the monasteries themselves gave way to
the manors (164) as Europe's new form of agricultural self-sufficiency, apt for the
new socioeconomic order that emerged out of the European Dark Ages.
On page 160, we are presented with another and fuller expression of the
author's thesis: "...Dark Ages occur as a consequence of ecological exhaustion and
stress and exhibit losses in wealth, trade disruptions, and simplification of lifestyle
and less hierarchicalization and more egalitarianism of the social structure." (160)
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To this is added the notion that the reduction in population and commerce
during a Dark Age provides the opportunity of nature for rejuvenation and the testing
of new socioeconomic structures. Finally, this section of the book provides a
narrative for the more than 50 (193-252 = 59) pages of graphs that offer statistical
information with such made-for-a-miniseries titles such as: "Northern Europe Pollen
Counts, Sweden (Agerods Mosse);" "Plantago Pollen Influxes for Hungary (SW of
Lake Balaton)" and "Mediterranean Arboreal/nonarboreal Pollen Percentages for
Turkey (Koycegiz Golii)."
The last chapter of the book speculates upon future directions. After a brief
summary of the ground already traced, the author focuses upon a coming Dark Age in
the 21st century that he predicts will be for "all the world" (174). Citing Paul Crutzen
(174), Chew describes the present geological age as "Anthropocene" in the sense that
current ecological problems are man-made. He lists them (175): global warming,
species extinction, soil erosion, pollution, fresh water and resource scarcities and
deforestation. He cites studies of the United Nations that document this stress and
those from the ecologically sound Club of Rome, not to be confused with the prolaissez faire Club for Growth.
Chew enters into a somewhat awkward comparison of the scarcities and
problems of the Bronze Age with the present time (178-179). Nonetheless, his
argumentation that a new Dark Age is approaching (if indeed, it is not already here)
seems persuasive (179ff). As he puts it: "... [these phenomena] reflect the same
trends and tendencies of previous Dark Ages in terms of ecological degradation and
climate changes." (181).
He notes that by contrast with the three previous Dark Ages, for this one there
will be no "new area" to exploit in relief of the old. Mercifully, he does not enter into
speculation about earth colonies under the sea or on the moon. He does predict
scarcity, political instability and a huge socioeconomic decline. He points to the
European Union as an effort to redefine national sovereignty and political rights in a
global era. I found intriguing his invocation of California as the most ecologically
devastated part of the United States and proof of the ungovernability of the new crisis
with old structures (183-84). I suspect that he would add the Louisiana Gulf Coast to
this list, if the book were still being written. When I call attention to his California
example, I only mean that it introduces a new note of contemporary specificity that is
novel to the rest of the book for the detail on contemporary ecological causes of mudslides, earthquakes, flooding, lack of snow (184-85) and the like. He underscores the
point that all of these have both ecological and socioeconomic impact on the political
system, suggesting that the ultimate effect will be a new Dark Age.
Morosely, Chew suggests that we are about to witness lower birth rates,
higher death rates, and reduction of the world's population by pandemics like AIDS
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and starvation of masses of people in collapsed nation-states. In comparing this age
to the Bronze Age, he substitutes the computer and cyberspace for tin and copper.
Chew is pessimistic about the ability of the political system of today to provide
transition; rather, he awaits "a voluntaristic human agency shift" that will take
hegemony away from corporations and states, and substitute use value over exchange
value as the measure of progress. Bye-bye Capitalism, he seems anxious to say, but
never does. He admits to dark pessimism in his prediction of a Dark Age, but he
admonishes the reader that the decline also offers "opportunities for Nature to recover
and for social systems to realign with the natural system." Such change was the
antidote to the world's past Dark Ages and to emerge from the new one, he sees the
need for hope.
This is a key contribution to civilizational studies. Along with more popular
works in this genre of combining germs with steel, etc. this effort offers a cogent and
even indispensable window on the interaction of nature and human effort. The title of
the book may be "Dark Ages" but it constitutes a bright new horizon for the
comparative study of civilizations.
Anthony M. Stevens-Arroyo
Other works by Sing C. Chew:
Chew, Sing C. World Ecological Degradation: Accumulation, Urbanization, and
Deforestation 3000 B.C. - A. D. 2000. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press, 2001.
Chew, Sing. C., Ecological Futures: What History Can Teach Us. Lanham, MD:
Altamira Press, 2008.
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